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Information Science (IS) is commonly said to study col-
lection, classification, storage, retrieval, and use of infor-
mation. However, there is no consensus on what infor-
mation is. This article examines some of the formal mod-
els of information and informational processes, namely,
Situation Theory and Shannon’s Information Theory, in
terms of their suitability for providing a useful frame-
work for studying information in IS. It is argued that
formal models of information are concerned with mainly
ontological aspects of information, whereas IS, because
of its evaluative role with respect to semantic content,
needs an epistemological conception of information. It is
argued from this perspective that concepts of epistemo-
logical/aesthetic/ethical information are plausible, and
that information science needs to rise to the challenge
of studying many different conceptions of information
embedded in different contexts.This goal requires explo-
ration of a wide variety of tools from philosophy and logic.
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to investigate the relevance
of logic and mathematical conceptions of information to the
discipline of Information Science (IS). One mathematical
framework that aims to provide a calculus of information,
more accurately “information flow,” is the Situation Theory
(ST) developed by Barwise & Seligman (1997), Barwise &
Perry (1983), Devlin (1991), and others. ST is related to
a number of other semantic theories of information (such
as Drestke, 1981; Bar-Hillel & Carnap, 1953), and it has
been suggested that it could provide a basis for informa-
tion retrieval (IR) (Rijsbergen & Lalmas, 1996). ST is based
loosely on the Mathematical Theory of Communication
(MTC) of Shannon & Weaver (1949), popularly known as
“Information Theory.” The relevance or otherwise of MTC
to IS, and more generally to semantic conceptions of infor-
mation, is a much debated topic (see Machlup & Mansfield,
1983; Floridi, 2005). The present article aims to contribute to
this discussion by showing the importance of epistemological
orientation in developing a conception of information for IS.
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In the following I analyze and criticize the concept of
information in ST, and more generally in formal logic, and
demonstrate that conceptions of information that neglect
or do not explicitly acknowledge the epistemological basis
of informational acts are not adequate for the purposes of
information science. I will argue that, notwithstanding the
limitations of the conceptions of information in logic, for-
mal approaches to information are useful for deepening the
understanding of information in IS and IR. For this reason I
will argue for an expanded scope for IS, which includes the
study of formal logic and the “philosophy of information”
(see Floridi, 2005, 2003).
The Scope
The debate about whether “information” or “document” is
the primary object of study in information science is a com-
plex and multifarious one (see, for example, Ørom, 2007).
A note on the scope of the present article is therefore in order.
Among the many points of contention is the claim that docu-
ment is a better unit of analysis than information for the pur-
poses of IS. For instance, Spang-Hansen (2001) writes that:
Information about some physical property of a material is
actually incomplete without information about the precision
of the data and about the conditions under which these data
were obtained. Moreover, various investigations of a prop-
erty have often led to different results that cannot be compared
and evaluated apart from information about their background.
An empirical fact has always a history and a perhaps not
too certain future. This history and future can be known
only through information from particular documents, i.e. by
document retrieval.
His point seems to be that the context and historical back-
ground of an event or an entity is lost when information is
abstracted from it, as in the case of an idea or a proposition
extracted from the document that contains or expresses it.
Hence, the argument is that document is a more appropriate
unit of analysis than information for the purposes of informa-
tion science. However, the fact is that creation of a document
implies abstraction in the first place. This fact is underlined in
Buckland’s discussion of Suzanne Briet’s, one of the pioneers
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of documentation, conception of document (Buckland, 1997,
p. 806):
There is discussion of an antelope. An antelope running wild
on the plains of Africa should not be considered a document,
she [Briet] rules. But if it were to be captured, taken to a zoo
and made an object of study, it has been made into a document.
It has become physical evidence being used by those who
study it. Not only that, but scholarly articles written about the
antelope are secondary documents, since the antelope itself
is the primary document.
I agree with the view that production of information (as
well as document) implies abstraction from context, and thus
loss of specificity. Previously (Karamuftuoglu, 2006) I argued
for a conceptualization of information in terms of the amount
of decontextualization involved in its production. However,
the aim of the present article is to develop, first, a concept of
information relevant to IS based on epistemology, and sec-
ond, demonstrate that it is, although distinct from, compatible
with formal logical conceptions of information. The discus-
sion of whether information or document is or should be
the primary unit of analysis in information science is outside
the scope of the present article. My view is that both concepts
have a distinct but significant role to play in IS.
Some researchers cast doubt on the relevance of episte-
mology to IS. For instance, Furner (2004) argues that:
Commonly, the everyday conception of knowledge (as the
content of mental states) is contrasted with a philosoph-
ical conception of knowledge (typically, as justified true
belief). . . . Somewhat oddly, given the nature of the concep-
tion of knowledge that is typically adopted in such accounts,
a tendency has been for authors to go on to use the results of
this kind of analysis to locate IS with respect to epistemology.
A more productive approach might instead be to relate work
in IS to that in philosophy of language. . . .
. . .[P]hilosophers of language have modeled the phenom-
ena fundamental to human communication in ways that do not
require us to commit to a separate concept of “information.”
Indeed, we can conclude that such a concept is unnecessary
for IS. Once the concepts of interest have been labeled with
conventional names such as “data,” “meaning,” “communi-
cation,” “relevance,” etc., nothing is left (so it may be argued)
to which to apply the term “information.”
Such an approach, I believe, overlooks the potentially
fruitful relationship between IS and cognate fields such as
the philosophy of information and formal logic. As I will
discuss in detail below, the philosophy of information and
formal logic are concerned mainly with the description of
the state of affairs in the world, i.e., ontology. Information is,
therefore, framed in these disciplines from that particular per-
spective. On the other hand, as I will elaborate in the rest of the
article, information science is concerned mainly with human
situations that involve negotiation and evaluation of rules and
meta-rules that concern knowledge and value standards. Such
issues are studied by, among others, epistemology. Informa-
tion in information science thus needs to be framed from
an epistemological viewpoint. Although epistemological and
ontological concerns are distinct, they are also complemen-
tary. Furthermore, as discussed in detail in the latter parts
of the article, both formal and informal logics are useful in
such tasks as subject analysis and classification. It is, there-
fore, important to develop a concept of information relevant
to the core activities in IS, and also congruent with the con-
ceptions of information in cognate disciplines, specifically,
logic and the philosophy of information. It is also worth not-
ing that epistemological research is not limited, as it seems
to be suggested in the above paragraph by Furner, to the ana-
lytical tradition in philosophy. There are other approaches,
such as social epistemology, “. . .which reject or ignore such
classical concerns of epistemology as truth, justification, and
rationality. . .” (Goldman, 2006). The present article is closer
in its orientation to social approaches to epistemology than
classical or analytical approaches.
Whether IS deals directly with information or informs by
means of documents there seems to be no ground for exclud-
ing the study of information from an IS perspective. The main
goal of the present article is to situate information in the con-
text of IS and in relation to cognate disciplines that study it.
The remark below by Alfino captures the essential goal of the
present article (cited in Herold, 2001):
To think about information rigorously you must read from
several disciplines, since information is not the specific object
of study of any one field. The division in thinking about infor-
mation is between more or less technical accounts which
suppose that information can be studied as a distinct object
in relative isolation from culture and scholars who feel that
we can only talk about information in relation to a ‘cultural
semiotic.’ [italics added]
The present article aims to bridge that division by elabo-
rating a concept of information congenial with the worlds of
both logic and mathematics, and sociology and semiotics.
The Meaning of Information
Information is an ambiguous term. Capurro & Hjørland
(2003) state that: “Almost every scientific discipline today
uses the concept of information within its own context and
with regard to specific phenomena.” (p. 356). “There are
many concepts of information, and they are embedded in
more or less explicit theoretical structures.” (p. 396). These
statements express, in my view, an important aspect of the
concept of information, and constitute one of the cornerstones
of the analysis of the concept in this article.
Informational acts are acts of cognition. Every cognitive
act, that is, process of knowing, involves a relation between an
object and a subject. Information is a product of such an act.
A subject who is engaged in an informational act, that is,
an act of cognition, manifests two orientations—toward the
object of cognition, i.e., ontological, and toward the pro-
cess of knowing, i.e., epistemological.1 Every cognitive act
is, therefore, an expression of ontological and epistemo-
logical interests. Analysis of the concept of information,
thus, has to be conducted on two dimensions: ontological
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and epistemological. I will illustrate and defend the above
premise in the pages that follow by a number of exam-
ples from different domains: computer science, information
science, mathematical theory of communication, art, and
instances of everyday mundane communication.
Ontological Orientation in Information: The Case of
Situation Theory
Situation Theory (ST) provides a mathematical frame-
work for modeling flow of information. It is loosely based
on the Mathematical Theory of Communication (MTC) of
Shannon & Weaver (1949), popularly known as “Information
Theory.” Situation Theory, and Situation Semantics, which
is based on it, are related to modal logic and possible world
semantics (Perry, 1997, p. 669): “Situation semantics was
originally conceived as an alternative to extensional model
theory and possible world semantics . . . Situations are con-
trasted with worlds; a world determines the answer to every
issue, the truth-value of every proposition. A situation cor-
responds to the limited parts of reality we in fact perceive,
reason about, and live in.”
Situations are structured entities that consist of objects
standing in certain relations (Kratzer, 2008). ST is a formal
language or calculus for deriving inferences between two sit-
uations. In this sense, ST is a mathematical framework to
model information, more precisely, “mathematical model of
information flow” (Devlin, p. 3). I will illustrate by means
of an example the flow of information in ST. Consider the
following set of plausible events or situations:
I am at home and I hear the doorbell ringing. The reader
would probably think that I would immediately assume that
there is somebody at the door. However, my doorbell is in
fact a chime, which is triggered not only when it is struck
intentionally but also when there is a strong wind outside. This
is why I do not immediately rush to open the door every time I
hear the doorbell ringing. In fact, I normally bother to answer
the door only if I know that there is no strong wind outside,
i.e., when there is no physical sign perceptible from inside
the house, such as the sound of the wind, or the sight from
my window of the trees bent under the wind. There may be
reasons other than the strong wind or someone intentionally
ringing it for the doorbell to sound. I know that kids sometimes
play ball outside my door and hit the chime accidentally with
it, which also causes it to ring.
In the above scenario, there are three distinct events or
situations that correlate with the doorbell ringing: someone
at the door ringing the bell; kids hitting it accidentally; the
wind blowing the chime. ST provides a formalism to model
the objects and the relations between them (situations), and
semiformal deductive apparatuses (or inference rules) to infer
the state of affairs in one situation (doorbell is hit by a ball
or struck by someone or blown by the wind) from the state
of affairs in a linked2 situation (perception of the doorbell
ringing).
Humans, more generally, cognitive agents (animals,
“intelligent” machines, etc.) comprehend the world by
classifying it in terms of objects. This process of discriminat-
ing uniformities in the world is referred to as individuation in
ST, and the entities individuated by the agent as individuals
or objects (Devlin, 1991, p. 21). Information in ST is seen
as a collection of objects and relations between them in the
form:
objects a1, . . . , an do/do not stand in the relation P. (Devlin,
p. 22).
For example, in the scenario described above we have the
following basic informational item or structure, known as an
infon:
<<ringing, doorbell; 1>>3
which denotes that object doorbell stands in relation
P — ringing. Whereas,
<<ringing, doorbell; 0>>
denotes that object doorbell does not stand in relation
P —. ringing.
Infons are, therefore, mathematical abstractions that con-
vey semantic content. An infon in itself is not true or false;
it acquires a truth-value in a specific situation or context.
An infon becomes true if there is a situation s in which the
statement expressed by the infon holds. This is denoted by:
s |= σ
where σ is an infon and s is a situation, which “supports” it,
or makes it true.
Let σ denote the infon that the doorbell is ringing and, σ′
that there is someone at the door:
σ = {<<ringing, doorbell; 1>>},
σ′ = {<<present, someone, door; 1>>}
If s denotes the situation that “I hear the doorbell is ring-
ing,” then s |= σ and if s′ denotes the situation that “there
is someone at the door,” then s′ |= σ′. The inference that
there must be someone at the door (made by the cognitive
agent who hears the doorbell) is represented by: s
c−−−→ s′,
where
c−−−→ denotes that there is a “channel” which links
situation s to situation s′. In other words, situation s contains
information about situation s′, viz., information that there is
someone at the door is inferred when the sound of the doorbell
is heard.
Channels are mechanisms for modeling the links or infor-
mational connections that support information flow between
situations. Rijsbergen & Lalmas (1996, pp. 391–392) give an
example of a channel that models the synonymy relationship
in a thesaurus:
<<present, belief; 1>>
c−−−→ <<present, dogma; 1>>4
The above statement expresses that if a document contains
the term “belief” then it also (implicitly) contains the term
“dogma.”
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ST provides an ontology (objects, situations, channels,
etc.) and a set of logical principles (inference rules) that deter-
mine the scope of deductions that can be made, and thus, the
type of questions that could be asked about the state of affairs
in a given situation. Insofar as we are concerned with objects
and the relations between them, i.e., situations, and the formal
mechanisms of making inferences about situations (I hear the
doorbell ringing → someone is probably5 at the door pressing
the doorbell), ST provides a theory of factual information.6 I
will call this type of information as ontological information to
distinguish it from epistemological information. In the former
case, the agent deduces (e.g., I upon hearing the sound of the
ringing doorbell) certain information about the state of affairs
in a certain situation (someone pressing the doorbell, or chime
is being blown by the wind), that is, individuated entities
and the relations between them. In the latter case, which is
discussed in detail in the next section, the agent confronts a
situation where the previous experiences of similar situations
fail to explain the current situation, hence forces the agent to
formulate new hypotheses, which requires a creative act.
As we have seen, information flow in ST is enabled by
constructs named as channels and constraints.7 There are four
main types of constraints (Seligman & Moss, 1997, p. 299):
1. Necessary Constraints, including taxonomic relations
between properties like ‘moles are mammals,’ appropri-
ateness conditions like ‘sipping involves sipping some-
thing,’ incompatibility restrictions between properties like
‘red things aren’t green,’ or even between individuals
like ‘Kriesel is not Keisler,’ and mathematical constraints
like ‘5 + 7 = 12.’
2. Conventional Constraints, including linguistic rules, syn-
tax, and semantics, the rules of backgammon, or the con-
vention of driving on the right side on the road.
3. Nomic Constraints, including all laws of nature, both the
commonplace—such as the law that unsupported coffee
mugs fall to the floor, and that the radio works if you hit
it—and the more esoteric laws about chemical valency or
electromagnetism. Most notoriously, ‘smoke means fire’
expresses a nomic constraint.
4. Meta-theoretic Constraints, including all those laws that
form a part of Situation Theory itself, such as the law [sic]
that if s |= σ then s is a situation and σ is an infon.
The above list appears to be haphazard (Seligman & Moss,
1997, p. 299), and the model does not tell us how to identify or
choose the right constraint or channel for inference. Chang-
ing the channel amounts to changing the information flow
(Lemon, 1998), thus, the channel/constraint determines what
can be known about a situation. For instance, consider the
use of WordNet8 as a channel as proposed by Rijsbergen &
Lamas (1996). Information science is related to computer
science through the meronym relation in WordNet, that is,
computer science is a part of information science. However,
according to WordNet, documentation is not related to IS.
In fact, it is not even recorded as a discipline in WordNet.
However, for instance, the article by Hjørland & Capurro
(2003) takes a view that documentation is an important part
of, if not synonymous with, information science. The present
article takes a different view on the same issue. This brief
discussion illustrates that what channels model depends on
the particular theoretical/epistemological position one takes.
The main issue with the constraints in ST is therefore: “. . .the
epistemological role of constraints, and not their ontological
status. A constraint is something that allows someone with
information about one situation to gain information about
a possibly different situation.” (Seligman & Moss, 1997,
p. 300).
On the epistemological consequences of the con-
straints/channels in the act of knowing ST is silent.9 This
marks the limit of its usefulness as a basis of theory of infor-
mation for IS. At this point it is worth remembering that ST is
a theory of factual information (a kind of semantic informa-
tion) implementing a naïve epistemology that could be termed
empirical realism10 by means of channels and constraints
(necessary, conventional, nomic, etc.). The other variety of
semantic information is instructional information: “Instruc-
tional information is not about a situation, a fact, or a state of
affairs w[orld] and does not model, or describe or represent
w. Rather, it is meant to (help to) bring about w. For exam-
ple, when the mechanic tells one over the phone to connect a
charged battery to the flat battery of one’s car, the information
one receives is not factual, but instructional.” (Floridi, 2005).
Instructional information is, hence, related to performative
acts. Performative acts or utterances are prescriptions, in the
sense that they bring about changes in the state of affairs in the
world, such as in the case of the sentence “I name this boat
Kon-Tiki.” In this sense they are opposite of descriptions,
which inform us about the state of affairs in the world. Per-
formatives/prescriptives are rule-changing acts, which bring
us to see the world in a different light (Karamuftuoglu, 1997).
In this sense, “. . .a prescriptive utterance cannot be derived
from description. Prescriptives are ungrounded, they are ‘left
hanging’ in the sense that they cannot be derived logically or
necessarily from what is the case, from ontology. . .” (Schrift,
2006, p. 69). Prescriptive/performative acts, therefore, give
rise to a totally different mode of communication than deduc-
tive inferences, which informs us about the state of affairs in
the world, as is the case with ST and other factual models of
information. I will analyze next the concept of information
from the perspective of prescriptive acts.
Epistemological Orientation in Information
In this section I will argue that the same set of events
described above (sensory perception of doorbell ringing
and someone pressing the doorbell, etc.) contains or may
bring about epistemological information (as well as other
types of information, such as aesthetic and ethical, see the
section Other Varieties of Information: Aesthetic, Ethical,
below). Consider the following extension to the set of events
described earlier regarding the ringing doorbell:
I hear the doorbell chiming, but there is no wind outside.
I know the kids are at school, therefore there must be someone
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at the door. I get to the door to greet the person, but there is
no one in sight. I got to the door quickly, therefore it cannot
be that someone rang it and walked away before I opened
the door.
At this point in the above scenario I have already made
a hypothesis, which I then quickly abandoned, namely,
that someone rang the doorbell and ran away. Clearly, we
are now dealing with a problem-solving situation, which
involves making assumptions, sorting facts or objects rele-
vant to the problem from those that are not, individuating
new objects, building hypothesis, and evaluating them. This
mode of reasoning is known as abduction. Abductive rea-
soning where questions such as “What is there to know,”
“What facts/entities are relevant to the problem,” “How could
I acquire relevant information,” etc., are asked, and answers
for them searched, is categorically different from the kind
of mechanical inference afforded by constraints/channels in
ST. In the above case of the inexplicably ringing doorbell, the
anomaly faced by the cognitive agent forces her to forsake
the usual explanations formed by expectations based on
repeated past experiences and/or conventions, and formu-
late a new hypothesis. But forming a new hypothesis usually
requires critical examination of the presuppositions held
regarding the foundations, valid sources, forms, and meth-
ods of knowledge acquisition, and the rules of inference,
i.e., epistemological assumptions. Insofar as the agent criti-
cally examines and consequently revises the epistemological
assumptions relevant to a given situation, it may be said
that she acquired or the situation imparted epistemological
information.
Acquisition of epistemological information, therefore,
results in a change in the knowledge of the methods of
acquiring knowledge about things in the world, and the
scope and validity of such methods. In short, epistemo-
logical information changes the vantage point from which
an agent comprehends the world. It concerns the theoret-
ical positions from which one approaches the problems
faced in the world. At this point, two aspects of epistemo-
logical or epistemic information need clarification. Infor-
mal approaches to epistemology (e.g., Gärdenfors, 1988;
Hendricks & Symons, 2006), which is also known as epis-
temic logic, the belief/knowledge states of agents as well
as the dynamics of belief/knowledge revisions are modeled.
Epistemological and ontological concerns, although distinct,
are closely related. However, in this article the dynamics
of belief/knowledge changes is emphasized instead of the
products of such changes (i.e., the resultant mental states)
when epistemological information is mentioned. Further-
more, whereas the literature on epistemic logic concerns
mainly an individual agent’s or a collection of such agents’
cognitive states, epistemological orientation in information as
conceived in this article emphasizes the transindividual social
structures, such as paradigms and metatheories in discourse
domains.
To clarify this issue I will now reconsider the case of a
fictitious work of information art,11 which I used elsewhere
(Karamuftuoglu, 2006) to discuss the aesthetic value of an
artwork as a function of its potential to inform research ques-
tions pertinent to the scientific disciplines from which the
work derives its methods, concepts, or tools:
Let us assume that there is an immersive 3D interactive art
installation, which represents a library where users (i.e., view-
ers) manipulate the books and other items on the shelves
directly by hand movements without the use of a mouse. . . . It
is conceivable that this installation could inspire a researcher
working in the field of digital libraries to imagine alternative
interface designs. Although interface design for retrieval sys-
tems is a valid problem for information scientists, arguably
it is not a core research area in information science. The idea
of an immersive interface whereby users interact with docu-
ments with hand movements and gestures could be a useful
idea for IR researchers regardless of any particular research
paradigm within which they work. . . .
Let us now imagine that the installation is such that queries
of previous visitors (i.e., users) are recorded and visually
represented as floating clouds in a 3D virtual library, which
persist after the owners of the queries left the installation,
and newcomers could see and manipulate them. We could
imagine that an IR researcher, working from within a socially
informed perspective, could be inspired by it and formulate
the idea that collaboration between past and present users of
IR systems could be possible and desirable. . . . [T]his is a
work of art relevant to socially oriented paradigm(s) in IR,
such as the sociocognitive view. . . .
Let us now imagine that we traveled back in time 30 years
or so, when the only established paradigms [in IS] were the
archetypal and cognitive. . . . Imagine that socially informed
theories did not exist at that time. It is plausible, then, to
argue that the same interactive art described earlier could
stimulate an IR researcher working within either the archety-
pal or, more likely, the cognitive paradigm to challenge the
basic philosophical assumptions of that particular paradigm,
for example, those related to methodological individualism.
(Karamuftuoglu, 2006, pp.1788–1789).
The cognitive paradigm in information science is char-
acterized by its focus on the individual user and her men-
tal models, knowledge-structures, etc., which is related to
methodological individualism (Hjørland, 1997b). It holds
certain epistemological assumptions regarding the nature of
knowledge and the right way to do research in IS. The end
result of the interaction between the researcher and the ficti-
tious artwork in the above-described scenario is, therefore, a
shift in the epistemological assumptions of the researcher
from those grounded in methodological individualism to
what could be termed social-constructivism, which focuses
on communities, institutional practices, division of labor in
society, and holds a different set of assumptions about the
nature of knowledge and knowing. To the extent that one can
still use the transmissional metaphor of information it is pos-
sible in the above scenario to speak of flow of epistemological
information from the source (the art installation) to the tar-
get (the IR researcher), or more appropriately, acquisition of
epistemological information by the cognitive agent from the
given situation.
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Varieties of Information
In the preceding pages infons and situations are interpreted
as abstractions that convey semantic relations. There is a dan-
ger in taking infons not as mere mathematical entities but real
“things” in the world that are transmitted between situations.
This is known as reification in philosophy. Reification is a pro-
cess where abstract entities or concepts are treated as concrete
“things” (Kemerling, 2002). Rijsbergen & Lalmas (1996,
pp. 388–389) note, “In Situation theory the concept of
situation is primordial. A situation is where information
resides. . . . Situation Theory is explicit about the ontology
of situations. It treats them as genuine entities in their own
right, not merely as formal devices as in semantic-model
approaches.” Devlin (1991, p. 46) states that: “A mathemat-
ical theory of information needs some specific notion of an
‘informational object’ or an ‘item of information’ to work
with. It may or may not be the case that cognitive agents actu-
ally function by handling ‘information’ in an ‘infonic’ form,
though it is an underlying thesis of this work that the concept
of an ‘item of information’ does seem to be an intuitive one.”
[italics added].
It seems to me that any theory of information which
focuses on objects and relations between them is likely to
interpret information as a thing (cf. Buckland, 1991) that is
transmitted between a source and a target. The notion of infor-
mation as a thing seems to have been partly derived from the
transmissional model of information of Shannon & Weaver’s
MTC, to which ST is related broadly.12 It is, therefore,
necessary to review MTC briefly at this point.
Mathematical Theory of Communication
Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of Communication is
concerned with the transmission of information from a source
to a receiver over a physical communication channel, more
specifically, data transmission rate of channels, and cod-
ing schemes to maximize the level of data compression. Both
the source (S) and the receiver (R) are characterized by the
number of states that they occupy and the probability distri-
bution over the states.13 The average amount of information
associated with S (or R), in other words, the average amount





Pr(Si) log2 Pr(Si) (1)
where Pr(Si) is the probability of S being in state i, and N is the
number of states S can occupy. For instance, for a source that
can generate 8 distinct symbols where the probability of each
message being generated is equal, N = 8 and Pr(Si) = 1/8.
Information generated when a particular symbol is selected
from a set of possible symbols is called the self-information
or surprisal, which measures the uncertainty associated with
the selection of the symbol, and given by:
I(Si) = −log2Pr(S) (2)
For N equiprobable symbols, Equation (1) reduces to (2).
For example, when N = 8, both H(S) and I(Si) are equal to 3
bits.
The rate of transmission between S and R, or how much
information there is in R about S is given by:
R(S; R) = H(S) − H(S|R) (3)
where H(S|R) is the average entropy of S conditional on R,
which models the average uncertainty about S in R. When for
each state of S there is a state in R that makes it certain such
that H(S|R) = 0, then R is a perfect indicator of S. H(S|R) can,
therefore, be interpreted as a measure of “tracking efficiency”
for the joint system (Harms, 2006, p. 232–233).
MTC is a syntactic theory of information, as it is not
concerned with the meaning of the symbols/messages trans-
mitted but their quantity. In a system of two symbols (N = 2),
say heads and tails of a coin, 1 bit of information is trans-
mitted regardless of whether the head or tail of the coin
symbolizes nuclear war or who is going to do the dishes.
Nevertheless, Situation Theory and various other accounts
of semantic information have two important connections to
MTC (Floridi, 2005):
• The data communication model, comprised of the source (S),
the receiver (R), and the channel (C). R contains information
about S, i.e, information flows from S to R in C.
• Information flow is defined in terms of transitions in a
system’s state space.
These two connections with MTC reinforce the interpre-
tation of information as a thing in ST, a case of reification as
discussed earlier.
Other Varieties of Information: Aesthetic, Ethical
Mathematical conceptions of information (e.g., ST, MTC)
are congruent with the notion of information known as the
“General Definition of Information” (GDI). GDI is explicated
in Floridi (2005) as follows [formatting is modified]:
• σ is an instance of information, understood as semantic
content, if and only if;
• σ consists of one or more data [defined in Floridi as “lack of
uniformity within some context”]
• The data in σ are well-formed
• The well-formed data in σ are meaningful
GDI conceives data and information as things or rei-
fied entities (Floridi, 2005). I have referred to conceptions
of information, which emphasize things (objects) and the
relationships between them, as ontological information. An
alternative account of information, which is more appropri-
ate for the purposes of IS, foregrounds the epistemological
dimension in cognitive acts. In certain situations, as discussed
earlier,14 the epistemological dimension is more prominent,
and can give rise to epistemological information. In other
words, certain situations may cause changes in the mind of the
agent regarding the sources, scope, and methods of obtaining
knowledge, i.e., metatheoretical rules of knowledge acquisi-
tion. This is related to but distinct from the knowledge of the
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state of affairs in the world.15 I suggest that there are types
of information other than factual (ontological) and epistemo-
logical. Similar to arguments put forward for epistemological
information, it is possible to argue that certain situations could
give rise to changes in the metatheoretical rules concerning
aesthetics and ethics in the mind of an agent. In other words,
a situation could cause a change or revision in the rules by
means of which one passes an aesthetic or moral judgment.
The relationships between epistemological, aesthetic, and
ethical varieties of information are complex. One quality they
share is the critical attitude they hold toward value standards,
respectively, in knowledge, cultural, and moral domains. In
this sense, they all involve prescriptive/performative acts. For
instance, Habermas (1981, p. 20) notes that that in aesthetic
criticism “. . . the adequacy of value standards, the vocabulary
of our evaluative language generally, is made thematic.”16
I conclude this section by modifying (a part of) the tax-
onomy given in Floridi (2005). Floridi divides semantic
information into two main classes: instructional and fac-
tual. He considers factual information as the mainstay of the
philosophy of information. My modified taxonomy includes
epistemological, aesthetic, and ethical information as subdi-
visions of instructional/prescriptive information, which are
the mainstay, in my opinion, of the philosophical approaches
to semantic information from the perspective of IS:
• Semantic Information




• Ontological (“Factual” in Floridi)
Varieties of Logic: Formal and Informal
A logic consists of a formal or informal language17,
a deductive apparatus and a model-theoretic semantics. The
deductive apparatus or inference rules provide formal mech-
anisms for making valid inferences, and the semantics to
codify the truth—or possible truth—conditions (Shapiro,
2000). Inference rules determine how conclusions are drawn
from premises. It is generally agreed that there are three dif-
ferent inference types: deduction, induction, and abduction
or hypothesis. Deduction is the type of reasoning that formal
logics aim to formalize. The differences between the three
inference types can be illustrated with the following example
(Peirce, 1958, vol. 2, para. 623)18 [formatting is modified]:
Deduction
Rule – All the beans from this bag are white. [given]
Case – These beans are from this bag. [given]
Result – These beans are white. [concluded]
Induction
Case – These beans are from this bag. [given]
Result – These beans are white. [given]
Rule – All the beans from this bag are white. [concluded]
Abduction [“Hypothesis” in the original]
Rule – All the beans from this bag are white. [hypothesized]
Result – These beans are white. [given]
Case – These beans are from this bag. [concluded]
Of the above, deduction is the only type of reasoning which
guarantees true conclusions from true premises. It is a type
of argumentation from general to particular. Induction is an
argument from particular to general, which produces only
probable conclusions that need to be verified by future obser-
vations (Burch, 2006).Abduction is different from both of the
above types of inference. It is a creative process of hypoth-
esis forming; based on the relevant evidence, the hypothesis
that best explains a given phenomenon is formulated. Since it
allows conclusions that are not guaranteed to be true, it is not
part of classical logic. However, for Peirce it is the only type
of logic that can produce new knowledge, and as such is a
fundamental part of scientific reasoning. According to Pierce
“Abduction is the process of forming explanatory hypothe-
sis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new
idea” (Peirce, 1958, vol. 5, para. 171–172). The following
example illustrates this process:
1. The surprising fact, F, is observed.
2. But if H were true, F would be a matter of course.
3. Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true (Peirce,
1958, vol. 5, para. 189).
Abductive reasoning has attracted attention from logicians
who study informal logic. Informal logic aims to understand
ordinary use of language and reasoning. It is an attempt to
develop a logic which goes beyond the classical logic. Partly
as a reaction to deductive models of argumentation required
by formal logic, informal logicians study abductive and con-
ductive models of inference (Groarke, 2007). Conductive
arguments are means of reaching strongly suggested but not
certain conclusions based on accumulation of non-decisive
evidence. Another mode of inference studied by informal
logic is dialectical logic. In classical philosophy, dialectics is
understood as exchange of propositions and counterproposi-
tions (sometimes known as theses and antitheses). The study
of dialectics in informal logic has highlighted the importance
of context in which arguments take place (Groarke, 2007).
However, one needs to turn to Hegelian philosophy in order
to fully appreciate dialectical logic in relation to production
of hypothesis and new knowledge, as well as the creative
process of abduction.
Although known to the ancient philosophers, development
of dialectical logic reached its peak in Hegel, especially in
his “Science of Logic” (1831/1969).19 Hegel widened the
scope of logic from propositional algebra to the study of
the change and development in society and nature (Blunden,
2007). Dialectical logic analyzes the qualitative development
of things and events, which are construed to be in a continuous
state of change. In fact each phenomenon/object incorporates
the seeds of its own negation at any point in time, which is the
driving force of qualitative change; everything develops even-
tually into something else. In this respect dialectical logic is
seen as the opposite of formal logic, which is founded on the
idea of identity and constancy (Stavinsky, 2003). The formal
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logic rests on three Aristotelian maxims (Ballantyne, 2008)
[formatting is changed]:
1. Law of Identity (A is A);
2. Law of Noncontradiction (A is not non-A);
3. Law of Excluded Middle (Any X is either A or non-A).
In contrast to the mechanical worldview of constancy of iden-
tity, dialectical logic holds that the basic rules of correct
thinking should reflect a universe, which is in constant flux
and qualitative change. The dialectical maxims of correct
thinking subsume the three Aristotelian maxims of logical
discourse (Ballantyne, 2008):
1. Law of Unity and Struggle of Opposites: Every object or
process develops into something else, not only because
it is affected by some external force but also because the
very components out of which it is made force changes. . .
2. Law of Transition from Quantitative to Qualita-
tive Change: Development cannot take place without
discontinuity. . .
3. Law of Negation: Every new stage, while synthesizing
in itself the progressive trend of previous stages, contains
within itself the preconditions for further development.. . .
The dialectical reasoning, therefore, aims to grasp the devel-
opment of phenomena in time due to constitutive internal con-
tradiction. The key to understanding the dialectical process
of qualitative change is, thus, to uncover the contradictions
inherent in any social or natural phenomenon at any point
in time which drive its development. The dialectical analy-
sis of phenomena/texts, as demonstrated in the next section,
requires formulation of an alternative hypothesis (antithesis),
which is a creative process similar to abduction.
Information Science and Logic
In this section formal and dialectical approaches to reason-
ing are applied to the analysis of a news article to demonstrate
their differences, scope, and applicability to IS. The example
text entitled “Roundup: France, Africa seek mutual bene-
fit” (document ID: XIE20030221.0307) is taken from the
HARD TREC 2004 corpus (Voorhees, 2005). This document
is retrieved in an experiment in response to the query state-
ment “AIDS in Africa” derived from the title field of the
TREC topic “HARD-409”20 by a standard IR system. The
article reports the results of the 22nd Africa-France Summit
held in 2003, which promises economic and social aid to
Africa. AIDS is mentioned only in a short section of the arti-
cle without mentioning anywhere the conventional measures
taken to prevent its spread, or the treatment of the sufferers,
and hence, evaluated as nonrelevant by the TREC assessors.
I have discussed the subject matter of this document
in detail elsewhere, and demonstrated that in contrast to
the TREC assessors it could be considered as relevant for
certain user groups who see the problem from an alterna-
tive theory of causation of AIDS (Karamuftuoglu, 2007).
Here, I will analyze the same document first by following a
procedure informed by formal logic, followed by the dialecti-
cal approach. These analyses will facilitate the understanding
of the roles that could be played by the two approaches in
subject analysis, and more generally IS, and will lead to the
discussion of the roles formal logic and the philosophy of
information could play in the development of information
science as a discipline.
Formalist Approach
An approach to subject analysis modeled on the formal
logic would start by identifying the rule that drives the
deductive syllogism. The TREC topic-narrative given earlier
(Endnote 20) would suggest that the enquirer’s main interest
is in the measures taken to prevent the spread of AIDS and
treat those affected by it. The commonly accepted cause of
AIDS is infection by the HIV virus. A document, thus, would
be on topic and relevant to the enquirer if it discusses the mea-
sures taken to prevent the spread of the HIV virus. The rule
to arrive at a relevance judgment would then be “documents
that discuss measures taken to prevent the spread of the HIV
virus are relevant.” In terms of the deductive syllogism:
Deduction
Rule – Documents that support measures taken to prevent the
spread of the HIV virus are relevant.
Case – XIE20030221.0307 does not support measures taken
to prevent the spread of the HIV virus.
Result – XIE20030221.0307 is non-relevant.
This was the conclusion reached by the TREC assessors.
I will show next how an opposite conclusion is possible
when an alternative theory regarding the cause of AIDS is
hypothesized.
Critical Approach
Dialectical logic is an important part of critical think-
ing: “[a]t the core of a genuinely critical methodology lies
the application of dialectical logic.” (Wainwright, 1997).
While formal logic does not admit contradictory judgments,
dialectical logic admits them. In fact, as discussed ear-
lier, it is a mistake of philosophical idealism, according to
dialectical thinking, to see things and events as unchanging,
self-identical (noncontradictory, equal to itself) entities. A
critical approach to subject analysis should, therefore, start
at uncovering contradictory or alternative theoretical posi-
tions on a given subject matter. The critical realist method
of subject analysis developed by Hjørland and his colleagues
approaches this task by explicating the alternative theories
in a scientific domain (Hjørland, 1992, 1997a; Hjørland &
Albrechtsen, 1995). From a dialectical position a document
may be both relevant and nonrelevant at the same time to dif-
ferent groups of users, or to the same user group at different
points in time.21
In the case of the aforementioned news article “Roundup:
France, Africa seek mutual benefit,” it appears to be nonrele-
vant to the query when it is analyzed from the perspective of
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formal thinking, as discussed in the preceding section. How-
ever, it is argued in Karamuftuoglu (2007) that the same doc-
ument could be evaluated in a totally different way. First, it is
necessary to uncover competing theories of AIDS causation.
One such theory is known as the Duesberg (2006) hypothe-
sis, which rejects the etiological explanation that HIV is the
cause of the AIDS epidemic. The Duesberg theory explains
the AIDS phenomenon in Africa and the developing world in
terms of conventional factors, such as malnutrition, parasitic
infections, and poor sanitation. However, it is unlikely that
the human classifiers would know the Duesberg hypothesis
or other alternative theories of the AIDS epidemic, which are
not supported by the vast majority of the medical commu-
nity. Karamuftuoglu (2007) suggests that general education
in major paradigms and schools in philosophy and social sci-
ences would help discover alternative theories within which
a document acquires its value. To illustrate the process of
the discovery of the relevance of a document to a potential
community of users, consider the following scenario:
The assessor does not have a rule that when applied to the
document XIE20030221.0307 yields a positive judgment. In
contrast to the scenario in the preceding section, the assessor
in this case applies creative thinking to the problem: “What
sort of an etiological theory would make this document rele-
vant to the query AIDS in Africa?” In the form of abductive
syllogism:
• The surprising fact, F (document XIE20030221.0307 is
relevant to the topic “AIDS in Africa”), is observed (i.e.,
postulated).
• But if H (there exists an alternative theory of AIDS causa-
tion, which explains the AIDS epidemic in terms of social
and environmental factors) were true, F would be a matter
of course (given that the document reports relevant infor-
mation on economic and social development of Africa;
see below).
• Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true.
In the above case of abductive logic applied to docu-
ment evaluation the process is more complex than the case
where the (surprising) observation corresponds to a fact. In
the case of document evaluation/subject analysis, it is not
known whether there exists a user community for whom
the document is actually relevant. This is postulated. Based
on this postulate and the content analysis of the document,
which reveals that it contains information about social and
environmental development of Africa, it is hypothesized that
there exist alternative theories of AIDS causation, which
explain the epidemic in terms of conventional environmental
and social factors. The assessor’s knowledge of the major
schools of thought in social sciences would obviously be
an advantage in formulating this hypothesis. The assessor
then needs to research to find whether the hypothesis is true,
i.e., there really exist social/environmental explanations of
AIDS. Failing to find one would make the document non-
relevant. Conversely, discovery of a relevant theory would
make the document relevant to a user group, who prioritizes
such factors in explaining health problems over virus-based
explanations.
Once the Duesberg or a similar theory of the AIDS epi-
demic is found in the literature the inference process would
revert to straight deduction as follows:
Deduction
Rule – Documents that support measures taken to prevent the
spread of AIDS in terms of environmental/social factors are
relevant.
Case – XIE20030221.0307 supports measures taken to pre-
vent the spread of AIDS in terms of environmental/social
factors.
Result – XIE20030221.0307 is relevant.
In the above scenario to successfully go through the
inference process the assessor first needed to establish that
the document contains significant information about eco-
nomic/social development of Africa. To single out that aspect
of the document content from potentially many others, aware-
ness of the importance of socio-economically oriented modes
of inquiry in social and medical sciences would be needed,
as noted earlier. This may not be sufficient alone to estab-
lish a link between the document and the AIDS epidemic
in Africa in the mind of the assessor. Other circumstantial
evidence would be needed in practice for the assessor to rec-
ognize that the document might be valuable for a certain user
group. Arguably, the following information reported in the
document provides the basis for a strong conductive argu-
ment that there could indeed be a link between the document
and the topic “AIDS in Africa” (Karamuftuoglu, 2007):
• French President’s and the United Nations Secretary Gen-
eral’s promises for economic aid to Africa to improve the
general health and environmental conditions there.
• Mention of the UN Secretary General’s concerns about AIDS
in Africa (although no specific reference is made to its pre-
vention from the perspective of the HIV-oriented explanation
of the epidemic).
• The presence of South African President Mbeki at the summit
who is known for his voiced support for the argument that
AIDS is the result of malnutrition, poverty, chronic diseases,
and other social/environmental factors.
The potential contribution of the dialectical logic to subject
analysis is the importance it attaches to looking at phenomena
(thus texts) from opposing viewpoints. In the above scenario,
by explicating conflicting viewpoints on the causes of AIDS,
our (subject analyst’s) knowledge of the subject moves for-
ward in the dialectical sense. Dialectical method recognizes
that the conclusions derived from dialectic analysis of the
contradictions constitutive of phenomena need to be tested
and verified in the real world; in the above case, based on
long-term experiences of people whose lives are affected by
AIDS. It also recognizes that values of theories, hence doc-
ument relevance, change over time as theories become more
or less useful to the lives of people. Another potential con-
tribution of the dialectics is that it provides a teleology that
directs the process of the analysis (see below).
The case of the news article on “AIDS in Africa” provides
another example of how an unfamiliar situation could lead to
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acquisition of information, which affects the epistemological
basis of thinking—epistemological information. The asses-
sor in the above scenario makes a hypothesis that there
exist environmentally and socially based explanations of
AIDS. The recognition of this possibility is an indication
that not only the way the assessor sees the relation between
environmental factors and AIDS has changed (ontological
information), but also his theorization of health in general has
changed from virus-based to socially/environmentally based
(epistemological information).22
It seems from the above example that abductive logic first
states a conclusion and then fixes the premises that makes
the conclusion appear natural in a post hoc fashion. In this
way, it transforms itself into deduction. But this is another
way of saying that deductive inferences do not carry any
new information. In fact there is an ongoing debate in for-
mal logic circles on whether deductions are “tautological”
or “analytical,” i.e., the information carried by the conclu-
sion is contained in the information carried by its premises
(D’Agostino & Floridi, 2009). Although there are attempts
to resolve this so-called “scandal of deduction,” such as in
the aforementioned article by D’Agostino & Floridi, there
is no generally accepted solution to this paradox thus far. If
deductions are tautological, my earlier explanation regarding
the formulation of the new hypothesis about the relevance
of the document XIE20030221.0307 begs clarification. In
the original account the impression is given that when the
assessor is aware of socially/environmentally oriented theo-
ries in social sciences, and the document contains relevant
information about economic/social development of Africa,
the formulation of the hypothesis regarding the existence of
socially/environmentally oriented theories of AIDS follows
naturally, as if in abductive reasoning there exists, nested
within it, an inner deductive loop in the reverse direction.
However, as noted above, if all deductions are tautological
this cannot be the case. The way out of this paradox is the
recognition that abductive reasoning or hypothesis forming
is not purely a logical, but also teleological or goal-oriented
process. In other words, the assessor in our example was able
to hypothesize the existence of alternative theories of AIDS
not because he followed the rules of formal logic verbatim,
but because in the final analysis he intended such an expla-
nation over potentially many others. Lawson (1997, p. 212)
states that: “Not much can be said about this process of retro-
duction [abduction] independent of context other than that
it is likely to operate under a logic of analogy or metaphor
and to draw heavily on the investigator’s perspective, beliefs
and experience.” In this context it is interesting to note that
according to some dialectics is not a formal axiomatic logic,
which sheds light on the paradox of hypothesis forming:
“[Dialectics is] not a strictly formal (abstract-general) logic
but rather a formal-substantive (concrete-synthetic) one. In
other words it constitutes a teleological rather than a tau-
tological system . . . The result of a dialectics investigation
must, in other words, stand on its own without depend-
ing on any axiom or postulate.” (Sekine, 1998; quoted in
Hirsch, 2004).
It is possible to compare subject analysis/classification
to science at a miniature scale. Every time a nonmechan-
ical classification decision is to be made, hypotheses need
to be formulated, consequences of them are deduced, which
are then subjected to experimental testing. This is known
as the “hypothetico-deductive” account of science. In the
hypothetico-deductive account the leap needed in formulat-
ing a hypothesis is unexplained. It is assumed to be an inborn
characteristic of creative people (French, 2007, p. 13). An
alternative account, as briefly discussed above, is that all sci-
ence, at least social science, is teleological in the sense that
they aim to bring about a certain goal. The goals make sense
within a certain set of core values, such as belief in human
liberty, emancipation, justice, etc. In this context, Gutierrez
(1998) writes that: “Teleology of the explanation corresponds
to the purpose of the investigator and has to do with the role
of subjectivity on the foundations of science, with the oper-
ation of non-formal powers of thought . . . Formalism is
useful and indispensable, but its functioning necessitates
the complementary full exercise of non-formal, ultimately
unformalizable, powers of thought.”23 [italics added].
It can be concluded from the discussion so far that although
formal logic may not be useful in eliciting the various mean-
ings of a given document for different user groups, it may still
be useful in uncovering more straightforward (denotative in a
semiological sense) layers of its meanings. It is in this sense
that some critics see formal logic as a means of rendering
explicit what is already known (cf. D’Agostino & Floridi,
2009). In the next section I will argue that for this and a
number of other reasons formal logic as well as informal and
dialectical logics should become a part of standard IS educa-
tion. However, it should be noted that formal logic on its own
is not adequate in establishing a basis for scientific inquiry.
Information in Information Science
Subject analysis and classification are complex processes.
Although they have a long history in information science,
there are no well-established methods of subject analysis for
the human analyst. I have argued in the preceding pages that
both formal and informal logics, including dialectics, may
have a role to play in the subject analysis process. Of the
two approaches, informal logic, in particular abduction, is
arguably an inseparable part of any scientific and creative
inquiry, to which I will return in the Conclusions section. For-
mal logic, on the other hand, appears to have a rather limited
role to play in subject analysis/classification. As argued ear-
lier, the deductive method seems to help render explicit what
is implicitly known, rather than yielding new knowledge,
thus, could help the analyst to uncover the more straight-
forward meanings of a text. However, it may have a more
fundamental role to play in IS in general.
Formal approaches to information are criticized from the
perspective of information science mainly for being con-
cerned with merely syntactic information. While this is true
for MTC, it is not true for others, such as ST. However, most,
if not all, formal conceptions of information, including ST,
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are concerned with factual, or as I argued in this article, onto-
logical information. Such theories have important roles to
play in certain disciplines, such as computer science, where
they serve useful functions in algorithmic processing of lin-
guistic and other types of information. For instance, Mutual
Information, which is related to a family of probabilistic inter-
pretations of information derived from MTC, is used in many
IR-related tasks, such as query expansion (Vechtomova &
Karamuftuoglu, 2004;Vechtomova, Robertson, Jones, 2003).
However, as I argued in this article, ontologically oriented
conceptions of information are inadequate for the purposes
of IS, since a good portion of IS work involves interpretation
and evaluation of information, not just modeling relations
between objects.
My arguments for the importance of the concept of infor-
mation in IS is not, however, limited to the usefulness of
mathematical conceptions of information to IR. The episte-
mological conception of information, which I have argued to
be vital in developing theories of subject analysis and clas-
sification, is, although distinct from, congruent with formal
logical theories of information. For this reason it is rather
unproductive to isolate IS from fields such as the philoso-
phy of information, which studies logical and mathematical
models of information. IS in my view has a unique role to
play in this regard. While formal logic and the philosophy
of information are mainly concerned with factual/ontological
information, concepts of epistemological/aesthetic/ethical
information are plausible as outlined in this article. IS is
uniquely positioned to explore such concepts philosophi-
cally, as well as practically, as IS is an evaluative/critical
discipline with respect to content, whereas formal logic is
not. Furthermore, as I have argued in a number of articles
(Karamuftuoglu, 1998, 2007), IS and IR are concerned with
production of new knowledge by establishing connections
between specialisms and disparate pieces of information. The
common ground between epistemological/aesthetic/ethical
information on the one hand and evaluative and knowledge
production functions of information science on the other is
that they all involve prescriptive activities that are concerned
with metatheoretical systems and rules.
IS is still a young discipline. To develop it needs to rise
to the challenge of studying “the many different conceptions
of information embedded in different theoretical structures”
articulated by Capurro & Hjørland (2003). This requires,
in my view, removing the conceptual boundaries that con-
strain IS to the study of a particular type of informational
objects—documents. There are recent developments, mainly
technological, that make the historical form of the document
unfit as the sole unit of analysis in IS, full exposition of which
is beyond the scope of the present article. Briefly, online col-
laborative writing systems such as Wikis and dynamically
generated and updated Web content, as well as the ubiqui-
tous hypertext format, are some of the recent technological
trends that foreground the sentence or the proposition rather
than the whole document as the primary unit of interaction.
For this reason it is, arguably, getting harder to think solely
in terms of the traditional document form.
IS needs to explore a wide range of tools in order to be able
to study the multitude of varieties of information production
and use in different situations and contexts. This would imply
the incorporation of both informal and formal logics, as well
as aesthetics, ethics, and other divisions of philosophy into IS
education, since a good deal of informational acts take place
in human situations that involve negotiation and evaluation
of cultural, moral, and knowledge standards.
Conclusions
There are many conceptions of information satisfying dif-
ferent theoretical needs in different disciplinary contexts. One
common thread that binds formal conceptions of information
is to treat information as semantic content about the state of
affairs in the world. However, such a conception is too lim-
iting for the purposes of IS, as one of the main tasks of IS
is to evaluate semantic content. Any evaluation is made from
a particular standpoint—theoretical or metatheoretical rules
and standards, which are subject to negotiation and qualita-
tive change. One can, therefore, speak of not only change in
information about the state of affairs in the world, but change
in information about the rules and meta-rules of acquiring
information about the state of affairs in the world. This is the
subject of epistemology, and within this context one can speak
of epistemological information that complements ontologi-
cal or factual information. In a similar vein, one can speak
of aesthetic and ethical information to denote changes in the
rules/meta-rules that govern aesthetic and ethical value stan-
dards. While formal logic and the philosophy of information
study mainly factual semantic content, IS is intimately tied to
epistemology because of its evaluative role vis-à-vis semantic
content, i.e., information.
There are limited formal tools that aid information sci-
entists in their evaluative tasks. Formal logic, specifically
deductive reasoning, could be of help in analyzing and eval-
uating information. However, formal logic is inadequate in
providing a ground on which a science of information could
be founded. This is mainly because science, and, generally,
creative activities, are goal-oriented or non-tautological in
the sense of being imbued in purpose, values, and non-formal
powers of thought. It is, therefore, necessary to study infor-
mal logics, in particular abductive and dialectical forms of
it, both of which aim to understand qualitative change, and
creation or synthesis of new knowledge.
Information scientists need tools such as formal and infor-
mal logic, but logic on its own does not yield a science.
Information scientists need theories and metatheories to cre-
ate hypotheses and test them. The foundation for IS in its
pursuit of critically studying and evaluating semantic con-
tent is, therefore, theories and metatheories in knowledge
domains, as well as empirical experimentation and observa-
tion. A broadened approach to the science of information,
which studies a multitude of varieties of production and use
of information in different domains, situations, and techno-
logical forms calls for a radical rethinking of the identity of
information science as a discipline.
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Endnotes
1I owe this formulation to Tunalı (2001) and Hartmann (1998).
2By means of constraints and channels, which will be discussed further
below.
3Infons could take spatial and temporal locations as arguments to make
them more precise. However, I present here only the bare bones of ST,
sufficient enough to convey the main idea behind it. See Akman (2009) for
full exposition of it.
4The correct way to represent this relationship is to use situation types,
or simply types, rather than infons as follows: [ṡ|ṡ |= {<<present, belief;
1>>}] −−−−→ [ṡ|ṡ |= {<<present, dogma; 1>>}]. Types generalize infons
by parametrizing them. In the above statement ṡ is a parameter denoting a
situation. This distinction, however, is not important for the purposes of this
article.
5It is not obvious how ST should handle uncertain information.
Rijsbergen & Lalmas (1996, pp. 397) discuss this issue in the context of IR.
6Factual information is distinct from instructional or prescriptive infor-
mation, to which I will return later on.
7A constraint is a relationship between types, whereas a channel is an
informational link between situations (Dominich, 2001, p. 243). For our
purposes this distinction is not significant.
8http://wordnet.princeton.edu/
9The concept of “individuation” implies a certain perspective from which
the world is classified. However, this concept is not elaborated further
in ST.
10I thank one of the anonymous referees for raising this point. Bhaskar
(2008, p. 16) notes that empirical realism is underpinned with “. . .the pre-
sumed characteristics of the objects of experience, viz. atomic events, and
their relations, viz. constant conjunctions.”
11Information art is defined in Karamuftuoglu (2006) as a kind of con-
ceptual art that uses concepts, tools, etc., derived from scientific disciplines,
such as biology, genetics, informatics. etc. An example of it is, Alba, a genet-
ically modified rabbit that glows in the dark, by the artist Eduarda Kac
(http://www.ekac.org/gfpbunny.html).
12MTC is a syntactic theory of information, whereas ST is semantic.
However, they are related for the reasons explained in the next subsection.
13The exposition of MTC in this section is based on Harms (2006).
14Another example of such a situation will be given in the section
Information Science and Logic, below.
15This distinction could also be cast in terms of the difference between
“knowledge-how,” which is the main focus of the present article and
“knowledge-that,” which is the main focus of epistemic logic.
16It is beyond the scope of this article to give a full exposition of the con-
cept of aesthetic and ethical information; however, Karamuftuoglu (2006)
discusses aesthetic evaluation of works of information art in some detail.
In this work, aesthetic value of a work of information art is linked to its
contribution to philosophical (ontological, epistemological, methodological)
underpinnings of the discipline(s) from which the work derives its concepts,
methods, and tools.
17Example of a formal language is the set of all syntactically correct
computer programs written in a computer programming language, such as
Java. An example of an informal language is English.
18All Peirce quotations are taken from Bergman & Paavola (2003).
19McTaggart (1922) provides a detailed account of Hegel’s philosophy.
20Title: AIDS in Africa. Description: What is the state of AIDS in Africa?
Narrative: Little attention has been given to the AIDS epidemic in Africa
that has decimated an entire generation of Africans. What is being done to
help prevent the spread of AIDS and to treat those already infected? What
sorts of public education/health measures have African governments taken?
What are the barriers?
21There are different opinions whether dialectical logic admits true log-
ical contradiction. For some, a thing is in an inconsistent or contradictory
state at two different points in time in its development, therefore there are
no true logical contradictions in dialectics. For others there are true logi-
cal contradictions, especially in Hegel (cf. Priest, 2008). In my application
of it to subject analysis here, it is both a contradiction in time and for dif-
ferent user groups, therefore not a true logical contradiction. However, in
my opinion different interpretations of the dialectic contradiction depends
on the particular theory or metaphysics of time, and may not be antitheti-
cal to each other as it may appear at first sight. For instance, in Bergson’s
philosophy, past, present, and future exist simultaneously (Bergson,
1896/1911).
22It is worth reiterating the point I made earlier regarding the two aspects of
epistemological or epistemic information. By epistemological information I
emphasize the changes or revisions made in the mind of the agent regarding
the theories about the sources, scope, and the methods of obtaining knowl-
edge, i.e., metatheoretical rules regarding acquisition of valid knowledge.
This is not the same as the agent’s knowledge/beliefs about the state of
affairs in the world (i.e., objects and the relations that hold between them),
which are usually the focus of interest in formal approaches to epistemology
(epistemic logic).
23Parallels to the above line of thought can be found in Lacan’s philosophy.
In Lacan “the Real” remains outside the realm of “the Symbolic,” implying
that it cannot be fully formalized (Glowinski, et al., 2001).
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